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MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS, THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF MATERNAL DEVIANCE, AND 
SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT LOVE AND JUSTICE 
April Cherry* 
Thank you. In the short amount of time that we have together today, I 
would like to accomplish three tasks. First, I would like to offer a brief 
overview of what and whom we are talking about when we talk about 
"maternal-fetal conflicts." Second, I would like to discuss some of the 
assumptions that are held about the women involved in these "conflicts," 
with the hope that giving voice to these assumptions might help us better 
understand why we may be willing to accept the coerced medical treatment 
of pregnant women, or legal sanctions against pregnant women who refuse 
treatment for the benefit of their fetuses. And, last, if time permits, I would 
like to offer my thoughts on how we might find a way out of this conun-
drum. I would like to begin to answer the question of how the law can 
facilitate justice for women and their fetuses under circumstances that are 
perceived by everyone involved as difficult. 
I had not planned to discuss the legal arguments for and against court-
ordered intervention in pregnancy, since this task has been met by many 
others with great clarity and thought.1 Nevertheless, I want to take a mo-
* Professor Cherry is currently an Associate Professor of Law at the Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law at Cleveland State University. This essay is an expanded version 
of a talk given at the Texas Journal of Women and the Law's conference entitled, 
"Approaching the Millennium: Emerging Issues in Bioethics and Information Technology," 
in March of 1999. Because much of this essay was initially given as a talk, I have left much 
of the "speech" quality of the essay intact I would like to thank the editors of the Journal 
for generously permitting me to flesh out a little more fully some of my thoughts introduced 
at the conference, and law student Andrea White for her help in finalizing the essay. 
1. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Wo-
men of Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HAR.v. L. REv. 1419 (1991); Janet 
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 
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ment and disagree with Professor Robertson for a minute. I want to re-
spond to his idea that the pregnant woman, having foregone the 
opportunity to abort, has thus increased her duty to her fetus.2 I believe 
that the notion that foregoing an abortion should be interpreted as a waiver 
of maternal autonomy and an acceptance of an increased duty towards the 
fetus is deeply flawed. I'd like to use an example of the access to abortion 
for women in my current hometown, Tallahassee, Florida, to illustrate my 
frustration with this line of analysis. Tallahassee, Florida's capital city, has 
a population of approximately 250,000 people. 3 It is a city with two non-
profit women's health clinics that provide abortions at a lower cost than if 
the services were provided by private physicians. Abortions are provided 
on only one day each week. The physicians who perform abortions do not 
live locally, but instead travel to Tallahassee in order to insure that women 
in the city, county, and surrounding rural areas have some access to safe 
and legal abortion services. To my knowledge, there are no private doctors 
in the city of Tallahassee who will publicly say that they perform abor-
tions. In fact, I know of only two physicians who will perform abortions 
and generally the only way to get an appointment with them for the proce-
dure is through one of the women's health care clinics. An appointment 
with either physician is possible only if you have money, approximately 
$350, or insurance benefits that will pay for the procedure. 
Under these circumstances, not having an abortion may mean that you 
do not have the money to pay for it, or that no facilities are available to 
you. So in the lives of real women, foregoing an abortion does not neces-
sarily mean that the woman wanted to waive her maternal autonomy and 
accept an increased duty to the fetus.4 Again, it may simply mean that she 
can not afford to have the procedure performed. That said, I would like to 
talk about "maternal-fetal conflicts." 
HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 9 (1987); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The 
Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951 (1986). 
2. For a fuller discussion of Professor Robertson's argument, see, e.g., John A. Robert-
son, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. 
L. REv. 405 (1983). 
3. See Estimates of Population of Metropolitan Areas Annual Time Series, July 1, 
1991 to July 1, 1996 (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/ 
metro-city/ma96-05.txt>. 
4. There are, of course, other reasons for not having an abortion, including the desire 
to have a baby. But the woman who desires to have a child does not necessarily intend to 
put her own health or life at risk in the process. Thus, without much more than the absence 
of an abortion, we can not in good conscience infer a maternal wavier of autonomy. 
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I. A Piece of Narrative:5 In the beginning ... 
So, now a story: 
I first came to this "maternal-fetal conflict" problem very personally 
during my first semester of law teaching. When the semester started I was 
six months pregnant. It was determined through a sonogram earlier in my 
pregnancy that I had a condition known as partial placenta previa. Placenta 
previa is a condition in which the placenta of the pregnant woman covers 
her cervix either partially or completely. In cases of complete placenta 
previa, a cesarean section is generally thought to be medically indicated. 
In these cases, women who go into spontaneous labor may bleed to death.6 
Cases of partial placenta previa often resolve themselves. The placenta can 
simply change its position during the course of the pregnancy without med-
ical intervention. Consequently, when a pregnant woman is diagnosed 
with partial placenta previa, a second sonogram is routinely performed in 
order to determine whether or not the situation has naturally resolved it-
self.7 So, during the seventh month of my pregnancy, a second sonogram 
was performed. Ultrasonography is an amazing technology. It allows doc-
tors and their patients (and the patient's family and friends) to view an 
image of the fetus in utero. It encourages us to imagine futures with chil-
dren who are not yet born. In any event, I was presented with a copy of the 
sonographic image of my fetus (now a fully formed grade-schooler named 
Olivia). As wonderful as it was to have a copy of this image to take home 
with me, it was also confusing. So that afternoon, after the sonogram was 
performed, I walked around the law school confused about this picture, 
trying to figure out why this picture didn't make sense to me. Finally I 
came across a colleague, and dear friend of mine, Meg Baldwin, and I said 
something like, "Meg, what about this is troubling me?" She responded 
quickly and simply, "You are not in the picture." She had hit the proverbial 
nail on its head. The free-floating fetus in the picture did not come close to 
my experience of pregnancy. In no way did it reflect the relationship I had 
with the fetus growing inside of me-a relationship that was at many times 
a unitary experience, a relationship that I was having with my own body, 
5. In both feminist and critical race critiques, storytelling, or narrative, is 
acknowledged as potentially transfonnative. Storytelling can help create alternative visions 
of reality. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Storytelling, 87 MlcH. L. REv. 2073 
(1989). 
6. See Nancy Wainer Cohen & Lois J. Estner, SILENT KNIFE: CESAREAN PREVENTION 
AND VAGINAL BIRTH AFrER CESAREAN 16 (1983) (defining placenta previa and explaining 
why cesarean section is medically indicated for complete placenta previa); AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE, STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 645 (1995) (defining placenta previa). 
7. See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 2001 (sonogram is exceptionally accurate as a diag-
nostic tool for placenta previa). 
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and at times a relationship of duality, in which I was as important to it as it 
was to me. Patricia Williams captured much of my own experience when 
she wrote, "I do not believe that a fetus is a separate person from the mo-
ment of conception. How could it be? It is so interconnected, so flesh-
and-blood boned, so completely part of a woman's body. Why try to carve 
one from the other?"8 
But the technology shows us a different story, that of the free-floating 
fetus, unattached to its mother, a singular entity. From the view of the 
computer screen, the fetus can look like an autonomous being, imbued with 
both legal and moral rights; a being in need of an advocate to protect it 
from a potential enemy.9 From the vantage point of the technology, the 
fetus, my fetus, could be imagined to be a separate person and a separate 
patient. 10 All of this talk of "separateness" becomes possible because the 
technology, by allowing us a peek inside pregnant women's bodies, has 
allowed both the legal and the medical imagination to perceive separate-
ness where there is, at least in my experience, unity.11 Hence, I hope that 
you can see why the issue of "conflicts" between pregnant women and 
their fetuses has become important to me on many levels. In that law 
school corridor, not only was I worried about issues of justice for women 
in some broad sense, I also worried about what was going to happen to me 
and my fetus when I went to the hospital to deliver my baby. In any event, 
this is how I come to this topic and the work I do. 
II. Two Paradigmatic Cases of the Maternal-Fetal Conflict 
The issue of "maternal-fetal conflicts" comes up in a course I teach 
on reproductive rights. We usually see the discussion in two circum-
stances. The first is the compelled, or forced, medical treatment of preg-
8. Patricia J. Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes itz a 
Racial and Gendered Context, 42 FLA. L. REv. 81, 92 (1990). 
9. See Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. R.Ev. 105, 123-24 n.78 
(1989) (arguing that the understanding of a fetus as a "living" being is a socially constructed 
belief, not a biological fact). 
10. I am also curious whether the image of the fetus is also racially white, given that the 
technology doesn't give one a "technicolor'' view. I wonder how this image plays into the 
debate. 
11. See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture ill the 
Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUDIES 263 (1987) (ability to see the fetus in utero 
through the use of ultrasound technology has promoted the view of the fetus as a separate 
individual, and as a separate patient). But see Susan Marken, Feeding the Fetus: 011 Inter-
rogating the Notion of Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 23 FEMINIST STUDIES 351 (1997) (arguing 
that emergence of fetal rights discourse is not solely attributable to technological innova-
tion; it is also a result of anti-abortion rhetoric). 
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nant women, usually cesareans or blood transfusions, and the second is the 
use of illegal drugs by pregnant women. 
A. The Coerced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women 
The first paradigm for the "maternal-fetal conflict" is where the appar-
ent conflict arises between the need of the fetus for particular medical treat-
ment and the pregnant woman's refusal of that treatment as suggested by a 
physician. Part of the problem with these cases is that often enough, the 
suggestions for a particular medical treatment are given by a physician who 
is not the pregnant woman's physician. This detail is important to me. The 
available data strongly suggest that in the vast majority of maternal-fetal 
conflict cases, i.e., where doctors and hospitals seek to compel treatment 
via law, the pregnant women are often poor, unmarried, and women of 
color. They present for labor and delivery at either public or teaching hos-
pitals. 12 They have received little or no prenatal care, so they do not have a 
primary obstetrician. The women we are talking about often do not have a 
trusting relationship with a doctor. In fact, they may have no relationship 
with doctors, except for when they come to hospitals to deliver their 
babies. 
In the context in which these women are birthing babies, and given 
poor people's and black people's lack of trust in the medical profession, 13 
it does not seem unreasonable for the woman presenting in that situation 
not to trust the opinion, however learned, of a doctor whom she has just 
met. The context also helps to explain how these women are labeled as 
deviant by other actors in the drama and subjected to heightened social 
control. But more on that later. 
In any event, the doctors and hospitals seek to compel treatment. The 
treatments are usually suggested because the medical staff believes that 
without treatment, the fetus will die or be born with significant damage, or 
because the physician does not believe that these women are capable of 
making an intelligent, informed decision. The treatments range in inva-
siveness from blood transfusions to cesarean sections. I am inclined to 
believe that a cesarean section operation is the most invasive. Perhaps in 
utero fetal therapy is more invasive, but after reading a few descriptions of 
12. See Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw 
ENG. J. MEo. 1192, 1193 (1987). 
13. See Patricia A. King & Leslie E. Wolf, Empowering and Protecting Patients: Les-
sons for Physician-Assisted Suicide from the African-American Experience, 82 MINN. L. 
REv. 1015, 1020 (1998) (discussing physician-assisted suicide in light of the negative his-
tory between the medical community and black and poor peoples). 
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cesarean sections, 14 I cannot imagine being more invaded, even though we 
tend to think of cesarean sections as not so dangerous. The cesarean sec-
tion operation is viewed as a "normal" method of child birthing, because it 
is done with much frequency. 15 Because cesarean sections have become 
normalized as a birthing method, we tend to think of them as not very 
serious. But in fact they are, particularly when compared to a vaginal birth. 
Cesarean sections are still considered major abdominal surgery, having all 
the risks associated therewith, including infection and death. 16 Addition-
ally, the maternal mortality rate for cesarean section patients is much 
higher than for those patients who give birth vaginally. Studies estimate 
that maternal mortality rates for cesarean delivery are two to four times 
higher than the maternal mortality rates associated with vaginal delivery. 17 
Notwithstanding all of this data, I am not arguing that cesarean sections are 
not relatively safe surgeries, but they do carry the risks of death and infec-
tion. In addition, it may also be important to note that cesarean section 
deliveries are often performed unnecessarily. For example, in 1991, there 
were approximately 350,000 unnecessary cesarean section operations per-
formed in the United States. 18 Thus, in the context of the danger of the 
procedure and its overuse, it makes perfect sense that women, when 
presented with the option of having a cesarean section, might say, "No, 
thank you."19 
14. For a very graphic and poignant description of a cesarean section, see MICHELLE 
HAruusoN, A WOMAN IN REsmENCE, 8-1-84 (1982), quoted in Janet Gallagher, Prenatal 
Invasions and Interventions, supra note 1, at 36-37 n.137. 
15. Cesarean sections are the most commonly performed major surgery in the United 
States. See Robert Steinbrook, Caesarean Birth Rates Falling in the U.S., Researchers Say, 
L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at Al. 
16. Even though cesarean sections are considered major abdominal surgery, the per-
centage of cesareans performed is still quite high. For example, in 1991, delivery by 
cesarean section comprised 23.5 percent of all deliveries. See U.S. Says 349,000 Caesare-
ans in 1991 Were Not Necessary, N.Y.TIMES, April 23, 1993, at A16 [hereinafter Not 
Necessary]. 
17. See Dianne B. Petitti et al., Jn-Hospital Maternal Mortality in the United States: 
Time Trends and Relation to Method of Delivery, 50 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 6, 11 
(1982). 
18. See Not Necessary, supra note 16, at A16. In the same year, Public Citizen's Health 
Research Group estimated that approximately 349,000 of the 1,000,000 cesarean sections 
performed in 1991 were unnecessary. See Leslie Laurence, Unkindest Cuts? Caesarean 
Sections Come Under Watchdogs' Scrutiny, Cm. TRIB., June 6, 1993, at 5. 
19. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Dissecting Women, Dissecting Law: The Court-Ordering of 
Caesarean Section Operations and the Failure of Infonned Consent to Protect Women of 
Color, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 211, 212 n.6. (1994) ("It is, given the extent of unnecessary 
caesarean operations, quite reasonable for women to question the recommendation for 
surgery."). 
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Also important in understanding the coerced medical treatment of 
pregnant women as morally and legally problematic is the demographics, 
including the race, ethnicity, national origin, and class of the women so 
coerced. I have already mentioned briefly some of the demographics, but I 
would like to add a few other facts to the mix. For example, a national 
survey performed in 1986 by doctors at the University of lliinois College 
of Medicine found that in a five-year period, at least twenty-one court or-
ders had been sought by hospitals that responded to their surveys.2° Of 
those twenty-one court orders sought, courts issued orders compelling 
treatment of the women in eighteen of the twenty-one cases. Over eighty-
five percent of those court orders were obtained within six hours. Eighty-
one percent of the women involved were black, Asian, or Latino. Forty-
four percent were unmarried. Twenty-five percent did not speak English as 
their language of choice, or their primary language. Finally, almost all the 
pregnant women involved were treated in teaching hospitals or were re-
ceiving public assistance.21 
The survey also indicated that in one-third of the cases, the prediction 
of fetal harm was inaccurate.22 Despite the inaccuracy of the electronic 
20. See Kolder et al., supra note 12, at 1192-93. Given that only 90 hospitals responded 
to the survey, the fact that 21 of the respondents sought court orders seems significant. It 
suggests that the reliance on law to enforce the physician's judgment regarding the care of 
pregnant women and their fetuses is widespread. 
21. See id. at 1193. 
22. See id. at 1195. In the majority of cases, a cesarean is recommended by the physi-
cian based on a diagnosis of "fetal distress." Fetal distress is often diagnosed by an inter-
pretation of electronic fetal monitoring technology (EMF). EMF can be highly inaccurate. 
As Margaret Lent notes, "[s]tudies indicate that the inaccuracy of the technique prompts 
unnecessary interventions and contributes to the nation's excessively high rate of cesarean 
delivery, a major surgical procedure which places mother and infant at great risk of injury 
and death than noncesarean delivery." Margaret Lent, Note, The Medical and Legal Risks of 
the Electronic Fetal Monitor, 51 STAN. L. REv. 807, 807-08 (1999). 
Another poignant point illustrated by the Kolder study was the attitude of physicians 
concerning pregnant women who refused to submit to physician recommendations. The 
survey indicated that 46 percent of heads of fellowship programs in maternal-fetal medicine 
(I suspect that these programs were formally called "obstetrics" before the widespread use 
of ultrasound technology) thought that women who refused medical treatment and thereby 
endangered the lives of their fetuses should be detained in the hospital, and 47 percent of 
these heads of fellowship programs supported seeking court orders to compel treatment. 
Kolder et al., supra note 12, at 1193-94. One of the reasons why I think that is particularly 
interesting is the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American 
Public Health Association have taken a position that physicians should not seek court orders 
to compel treatment for competent pregnant women. See Committee on Ethics, American 
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict, Comm. 
Opinion No. 55 (Oct. 1987) (quoted in James J. Nocon, Physicians and Maternal-Fetal 
Conflict: Duties, Rights and Responsibilities, 5 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 18 (1990/91) [hereinafter 
ACOG Committee Report]. This position is taken particularly out of fear that the women 
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fetal monitoring technology, physicians and hospitals rely on its data as a 
safeguard against the often-phantom threat of legal liability for medical 
malpractice. 23 Physicians and hospitals inform the presiding judge that, 
without the proposed medical and legal intervention proposed, the fetus 
will die. Well, in one-third of those cases, the doctors' predictions were 
wrong. I do not think these predictions of poor outcomes are necessarily 
the result of doctors' practicing bad medicine. I think the inaccuracy of the 
predictions is caused by the uncertainty that is intrinsic to medical judg-
ment. As a committee on ethics of the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology suggested, "The role of obstetrician should be one of an in-
formed educator and counselor weighing the risks and benefits to both pa-
tients (the pregnant woman and her fetus) as well as realizing that tests, 
judgments, and decisions are fallible."24 Medicine is art as well as science; 
hence, doctors make mistakes. And given that doctors make mistakes and 
the law nevertheless enforces their judgments, then I want to ask why don't 
we allow women to make decisions in these contexts that may have a nega-
tive outcome for the fetus? Why doesn't the law support the judgment of 
women regarding their pregnancies? Why can't a woman make a choice 
vis-a-vis herself and her fetus that might have a bad outcome? In other 
words, why can't women make mistakes? What compelled medical treat-
ment means is that doctors get to make choices that affect both a pregnant 
woman and her fetus all the time, with the force of the law to back them 
up. Why do we put more faith in the physicians than we do in the women? 
Why don't we care what women want or need? Where is the justice, love, 
or compassion for the pregnant woman who is trying to make a difficult 
decision? 
B. The Case of the Pregnant User of Illicit Drugs 
The second situation where there seems to be an apparent maternal-fetal 
conflict is in the case of drug-addicted pregnant women. The cases in this 
category are most often discussed as the case of the pregnant woman ad-
dicted to crack as opposed to the one addicted to powder cocaine. We 
know that in the public mind the difference between the crack user and the 
powder cocaine user is a racial difference. Because crack is less expensive 
than powder cocaine, its use is more likely to be associated with poor peo-
who are in the most need of prenatal care, the women who most need to deliver in a hospi-
tal, the women who have the highest-risk pregnancy, will not present themselves to the 
hospital, and the outcomes will be worse. Perhaps if we can get the women into the hospi-
tal, we can maybe convince them through some love and justice and respect, that interven-
tion is necessary, if it is indeed necessary. 
23. See Lent, supra note 22, at 808. 
24. See AGOG Committee Report. 
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pie, e.g., black folks, than with the wealthier drug users, e.g., white folks.25 
In fact, drug-using and drug-addicted women who have been detained in 
hospitals or sent to prison out of concern for their fetuses have been largely 
poor women of color.26 Judges send these women to jails and prisons with 
the belief that "preventative detention" will foster fetal welfare. As Sandra 
Garcia reports, a well-respected state court judge has said that "he would 
have no compunction regarding ruling outside of sentencing guidelines if a 
'doper' came before him during her pregnancy, and that he firmly believed 
that of the 300 judges who had just attended a conference, the vast majority 
would rule in ways that would favor fetal health."27 Unfortunately, "pre-
ventative detention" is not necessarily conducive to either maternal or fetal 
heath. Not only are illicit drugs available in jails and prisons,28 these insti-
tutions generally lack the medical facilities necessary for good prenatal 
care.29 Furthermore, shackling a woman during childbirth is not conducive 
to maternal-infant bonding, thought to be of prime importance for the in-
25. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1945, 
1958-59 (1993) (noting the harsher sentencing guidelines for crack, which is primarily used 
by blacks, as compared to those for cocaine, which is primarily used by whites). Of course, 
there are many legal substances that can cause great damage to a growing fetus, including 
alcohol and nicotine. In fact, the data is much more conclusive regarding fetal alcohol 
syndrome than the damage done to infants exposed to crack or cocaine in utero. See Lynn 
M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 A.Ls. 
L. REv. 999, 1018 (1999) (noting a higher risk of fetal harm from exposure to alcohol and 
cigarettes). And, although there is a growing amount of social censure against women who 
smoke tobacco products and who drink alcohol while pregnant, there does not seem to be 
the same political will to legally sanction their behavior. I suspect the fact that the image of 
"the smoker'' and "the drinker'' are not racialized has something to do with the almost 
singular focus on crack-exposed fetuses and their mothers. 
26. See generally Roberts, Crime Race, and Reproduction, supra note 25, at 1953 and 
accompanying notes (citing study that reveals that black pregnant women were 10 times 
more likely than white pregnant women to be reported to public health authorities even 
though the rates of substance abuse are similar for black and white women); Dawn Johnsen, 
Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 569, 576-606 (1992) (discussing statistical evidence that African-American wo-
men are the primary targets of fetal drug-related prosecutions). 
27. Sandra Anderson Garcia, Maternal Drug Abuse: Laws and Ethics as Agents of Just 
Balances and Therapeutic Interventions, 28(13) lNT'L J. AoorcnoNs 1311 n.3 (1993). 
28. See, e.g., Elsa Walsh, Drug Use at Lorton 'Disturbing': Increased Demand by In-
mates Feared, WASH. PosT, July 3, 1989, at BOl (discussing the ready availability of illegal 
drugs in prison); Catherine Foster, Fetal Endangennent Cases Increase, CHRISTIAN Sci. 
MONITOR, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8 (same). 
29. See Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and 
Legal Penalties for Potentially Hannful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 246 J. AM. MEo. 
Ass'N 2663, 2667 (1990) (opposing preventative detention for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing the fact that prisons have inadequate health care resources, and are "shockingly deficient 
in attending to the health care needs of pregnant women"); see also Barrie L. Becker, Order 
in the Court: Challenging Judges Who Incarcerate Pregnant Substance-Dependent Defend-
254 Texas Journal of Women and the Law [Vol. 8:245 
fant. It serves merely to punish the woman and show society's contempt 
for poor, non-English speaking women of color and their children. If we 
care about infants as much as we seem to care about fetuses, we might 
want to reconsider "preventative detention," and consider other ways to 
encourage maternal and fetal health. 
Because the image of "the crack-head" is so racialized, this focus on 
crack-exposed fetuses and pregnant crack users makes me suspicious.Jo 
Nevertheless, there is some truth to the charge that women who use crack 
while pregnant may under many circumstances give birth to babies whose 
health is, at least initially, compromised.JI However, the data on the long-
term harm maternal crack use is not as conclusive as the public has been 
led to believe. Although the babies born to women who use crack during 
their pregnancies may be born with a host of medical problems, it is un-
clear as to whether these medical problems, other than any drug withdrawal 
that the infant might suffer, are the result of the maternal crack use, or lack 
of prenatal care and maternal malnutrition-just plain old poverty.J2 It is 
also unclear as to whether the initial condition of the newborn born in these 
circumstances has any long-term effects. At five years old, "crack babies" 
look a lot like the "non-crack babies" if they are well nourished and live in 
fairly supportive environments.JJ Therefore, it is highly probable that the 
ants to Protect Fetal Health, 19 HAsTINGs CoNsT. L. Q. 235, 239 (1991) (discussing dan-
gerous lack of prenatal care in jails and prisons). 
30. Laura Gomez suggests !hat the convergence of the war on drugs with the abortion 
debate propelled "crack-babies" into the public imagination. See generally Laura E. 
Gomez, MiscONCEfVlNG MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND TIIE POLITICS OP 
PRE-NATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 1-41 (1997). One commentator notes, "The crack-baby myth 
was so powerful because it had something for everyone, whether one's ideological leaning 
called for enhancing public programs to meet the crisis, or for punishing the drug addicted 
mothers seen as responsible for it." Katherine Geider, Crackpot Ideas, MOTHER JoNES, 
July/Aug. 1995, at 55. 
31. Initial studies by Dr. Ira Chasnoff and his colleagues suggested that correlations 
exist between the use of cocaine during pregnancy and instances of premature birth and low 
birth weight. These studies also suggest !hat higher rates of physical, mental, and emotional 
problems were to be found in children who had been exposed to crack in utero. See gener-
ally Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 666 (1985); 
Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Perinatal Cerebral Infarction and Maternal Cocaine Use, 108 J. 
PEDIATRICS 456 (1986); Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure: Effects on Neonatal 
and Infant Growth and Development, 8 NEUROBEHAVIORAL TOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 
357 (1986). 
32. Gideon Shear Koren et al., Bias Against the Null Hypothesis: The Reproductive 
Hazards of Cocaine, LANCET (Dec. 16, 1989), at 1440-42 (criticizing the methodology of 
Chasnoff's early studies on the effect of fetal exposure to cocaine and suggesting other 
causes for poor fetal outcomes). 
33. See Nancy L. Day & Gale A. Richardson, Comparative Teratogenicity of Alcohol 
and other Drugs, 18 ALcoHOL REs. WoRLD 42 (1994). The authors note that: 
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crack-baby crisis to which the law has been responding is more myth than 
reality. 
In summary, when we look at the demographics of those pregnant 
women described as being in conflict with their fetuses, we see that the 
group is composed of those women who are some of the most disen-
franchised in our society and most subject to other forms of reproductive 
control.34 We can also see that although physician prediction of fetal harm 
is often inaccurate, it is nevertheless preferred over the judgment, also 
often imperfect, of these pregnant women. These factors, especially when 
taken together, should cause us to question any policy regulating the rela-
tionship between pregnant women and their fetuses. History tells us that 
any such rules will be used against women, particularly women of color, as 
a tool of social control. 
III. The Construction of Social Deviance in the Construction of the 
Maternal-Fetal Conflict 
Next, I would like us to think about the social assumptions we make 
about these women that may underlie our acceptance of coerced medical 
treatment or legal intervention into maternal decisions and behaviors dur-
ing pregnancy and childbirth. In this regard, I have been thinking about 
sociological theories of social deviance. Sociologists have noted that devi-
ance, at least from a popular point of view, is behavior that is bizarre, 
unconventional, hard to understand, or behavior that people disapprove 
of.35 But, from a sociological perspective, this kind of common sense defi-
nition is both incomplete and deceptive for two reasons. First, what is 
peculiar or bizarre in one situation may be ordinary, understandable, and/or 
rational in another situation. And even the most seemingly bizarre behav-
ior can be understood as reasonable if we are cognizant of the context in 
Id. 
Negative effects of prenatal cocaine exposure have not been substantiated. 
Although some investigators have demonstrated significant effects of cocaine use 
during pregnancy, almost all of these relationships disappear when factors such as 
prenatal care, lifestyle and multiple drug use are assessed .... Thus previous 
reports may have attributed poor pregnancy outcomes to prenatal cocaine expo-
sure because of the failure to control for associated factors. 
34. See e.g., Relf v. Weinberger, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that between 
100,000 and 150,000 poor women were sterilized annually under federally-funded pro-
grams); Madrigal v. Qulligan, No. CV75-2057 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1978), aff'd, 639 F.2d 
789 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that non-consensual sterilization of Mexican-American women 
is not compensable due to "abnormalities" of Mexican-American subculture of which white 
American doctors could not be expected to understand). See also Roberts, Crime, Race, 
and Reproduction, supra note 25; Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 1. 
35. See, e.g., MARGARET ANDERSEN, THINKING ABOUT WoMEN: SocIOLOGICAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON SEX AND GENDER 248 (3d ed. 1993). 
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which the behavior occurs. 36 Deviance is also a social definition. It de-
scribes whether the behavior in question is approved of or disapproved of 
by the larger culture. Deviance as a social definition of whether behavior 
is approved or disapproved depends on who is behaving and who is defin-
ing the behavior.37 Deviance is socially constructed, subjecting its objects 
to social control. 38 So, deviance must be understood as behavior that is 
located in a social context. In the case of the maternal-fetal conflict, the 
context is one in which those with little social, political, or economic 
power are defined and controlled by those with much: the medical profes-
sion and the judicial system.39 In fact women in particular are likely to be 
labeled deviant if their behavior does not adhere to the dominant gender 
norms.40 Although many gender norms are implicit, maternity norms are 
clearly expressed in numerous ways by the dominant culture.41 For exam-
ple, under these same gender norms, good women are thought to be, by 
nature, altruistic and self-sacrificing.42 As Janice Raymond notes: 
For women, gift-giving is a source of identity, status, and relief 
from guilt. Women who don't give time, energy, care, sex ... 
are exposed to disapproval or penalty. But the more important 
element here is that on a cultural level women are expected to 
36. See id. 
37. As one author explains, social groups create deviance by making rules and pro-
claiming that infractions of those rules constitutes deviance, and by applying the rules to 
particular people and labeling them as outsiders. Thus, deviance is not a quality of the act 
the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and 
sanctions to an "offender." See HowARD S. BECKER, THE OUTSIDERS 9 (1963). 
38. Cf. EDWIN ScHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: !Ts Soc10LomcAL IMPLICATIONS 
51 (1971) (stereotyping and deviance influence the substance and implementation of legal 
rules and political policy); BECKER, supra note 37, at 18 (the labeling of deviance is part of 
a political process). 
39. John Lofland has described deviance as "the name of the conflict game in which 
individuals or loosely organized small groups with little power are strongly feared by a well 
organized sizable minority or majority who have a large amount of power." JOHN LOFLAND, 
DEVIANCE AND IDENTITY 14 (1969) (quoted in SCHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR, 
supra note 38, at 31). 
40. See EDWIN SCHUR, LABELING WoMEN DEVIANT 52 (1983). 
41. For example, in one reported study, researchers found that married mothers were 
viewed as having the most positive personality traits when compared to women in general, 
divorced mothers, stepmothers and never-married mothers. Married mothers were viewed 
as more forgiving, caring, warm, and generous than women in general. On the other hand, 
never-married mothers were viewed as having poor childrearing abilities, and were more 
likely than other mothers to be characterized as irresponsible, stupid, lazy and drug abusers. 
See Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, The Content of Mother Stereotypes, 32 SEX 
ROLES 495, 507-10 (1995). 
42. See SCHUR, LABELING WOMEN DEVIANT, supra note 40. 
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donate themselves in the form of time, energy and body, particu-
larly as mothers.43 
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How does this relate to maternal-fetal conflicts? I believe that accept-
ance of deviance as social construction helps our understanding of the issue 
in two ways. First, it helps us comprehend that "deviance" is part of both a 
social and political process that is fraught with issues of dominance and 
subordination. Second, it may help us to understand our reaction to women 
whose deviance is derived from not complying with our social definition of 
good, nurturing, altruistic mothers.44 So, when women, particularly 
mothers who are poor, of color, non-English speaking, or illicit drug users, 
do not comply with physicians' expectations or suggestions, they are un-
derstood as selfish and uncaring (or stupid), and just plaid old bad mothers. 
Women who are bad mothers (through willfulness or ignorance) are inap-
propriate decision-makers for their fetuses. Once they are described as de-
viant in these ways, pregnant women become subject to physician and 
judicial control. 
IV. Some Thoughts About Love and Justice 
I would like to suggest a way out of the kind of objectification of 
women that we find in the maternal-fetal conflict; that is, the construction 
of non-conforming or non-altruistic pregnant women as deviant and hence 
objects for social and legal control. My suggestion is not new, but I be-
lieve that it is nevertheless quite radical and worth repeating. My sugges-
tion is for us to love women and infants as much as we seem to love the 
potentiality of the fetus. If we really loved women and cared about justice 
for them, we would be more apt to respect their bodies, their self-determi-
nation, and their choices, even when we don't agree with the choices made. 
So if we dared to care about justice for women, then what type of 
social and legal policy might we develop? I think that justice for women 
and their infants demands that we look at the material needs of all women 
43. JANICE RAYMOND, WoMEN AS WoMBs 52 (1993). Raymond also notes that wo-
men's altruism on behalf of their fetuses is required even in death. For example, courts 
have ordered postmortem and propremortem obstetrical interventions, such as keeping 
brain-dead women on ventilators under the flag of fetal rights. See id. at 47. 
44. We all know that when children perform poorly in school, when they misbehave, 
when they commit crimes, when they present with almost any kind of psychological issue, 
the mothers are blamed. The mothers aren't nurturing enough. See e.g., Paula J. Caplan & 
Ian Hall McCorquodale, Motherblaming in Major Clinical Journals, 55 AM. J. 0RTIIOPSY-
CHIATRY 345, 347-48 (1985). Caplan and McCorquodale surveyed psychological journals 
and found that mothers were blamed for a large variety of psychological problems in their 
children, including bed-wetting, psychosis, sexual dysfunction, frigidity, and fears of penile 
shrinkage. Fathers were barely mentioned, but when mentioned, they were mentioned in 
only positive ways. 
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and infants and translate those needs into affirmative rights or affirmative 
obligations on the part of the state.45 I have argued elsewhere, as have 
others, that rights discourse, when divorced from substantive needs, can 
divert political vision from the actual needs of oppressed people and 
thereby reinforce the rhetoric of individualism that is then used as an expla-
nation for the material conditions of oppressed people's lives.46 But I am 
not arguing for rights in some abstract form. Here I am arguing for affirm-
ative rights for women that are connected to their very real needs before, 
during, and after pregnancy. So what do women need? Two needs have 
already been easily identified: women (and infants) need access to medical 
care (e.g., well-woman, prenatal, and post-natal care) that is affordable, or 
in many instances, free; and women, particularly drug addicted women, 
need access to drug treatment facilities that meet their needs (e.g., facilities 
that provide child care can better serve women who may have children), 
especially during pregnancy, when they are most likely to be open to the 
possibility of sobriety. Other important needs also exist, such as the neces-
sity for adequate food, housing, and education. Women and infants are 
benefited by access to all of these resources. We have to find a way to 
translate these very real needs into affirmative obligation on the part of the 
state if we care about women and children. These substantive needs do not 
have to be addressed as long as we hold on to our love of the potentiality of 
the fetus. If we choose not to meet the material needs of women and chil-
dren and continue to hold on only to our love of the fetus, then we are 
engaging in what Janet Gallagher has called "collective bad faith."47 She 
argues: 
Giving fetuses rights and lawyers, while failing to provide acces-
sible pre-natal care and drug treatment on demand for women 
who carry them, is mere posturing-a paradigm of societal bad 
45. See Nancy Fraser, Struggle Over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical 
Theory of Late Capitalist Political Culture, in UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, 
AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY Soc1AL THEORY 183 (arguing for the translation of justi-
fied needs into social rights). 
46. See April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a 
Matter of Choice?, 10 Wisc. WoMEN's L.J. 161, 215 (1996); see also John 0. Calmore, 
Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp and Fire Music: Searching for an Authentic lntellectttal 
Life in a Multicultural World, 65 CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2215 (1992). 
47. Janet Gallagher, Collective Bad Faith: Protecting the Fetus, in REPRODUCTION, 
E1wc, AND THE LAw: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 352 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995) ("This 
insistence on pointing the finger ... at individual women is an exercise in collective bad 
faith, a social self-deception which rationalizes our passivity toward the genuinely horrify-
ing living conditions confronting many poor women."). Id. See also Katha Politt, Fetal 
Rights, Women's Wrongs, in REASONABLE CREATURES 173 (1994) (focusing on how mater-
nal behavior allows the government to give the appearance of being concerned about babies 
without having to challenge the status quo). 
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faith. It is a refusal to shoulder our one social burden, a self-
indulgent unwillingness to confront the urgent and very difficult 
task of healing the shattered lives of so many poor women 
among us.48 
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Nevertheless, I may be asked, what about the health of the fetus, who 
may be a future child? I would like to offer two observations regarding 
this question. The first is that if we look at fetal outcomes under our cur-
rent social, political, and economic system (where doctors and judges seem 
to increasingly control pregnancy and childbirth, where poor women don't 
have access to adequate prenatal care, good nutrition, or drug treatment 
facilities, where I would argue that we don't love these women), we have 
some poor fetal outcomes. My second observation is that if we translate 
the material needs of women into affirmative rights, we will undoubtedly 
help to create the conditions for more positive fetal outcomes, even in the 
worst of circumstances. We have so little to lose and so much to gain. 
48. Gallagher, supra note 47, at 361-62. 
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Mon Oct 21 10:56:21 2019
Citations:
Bluebook 20th ed.
			                                                                
April Cherry, Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, the Social Construction of Maternal Deviance,
and Some Thoughts about Love and Justice, 8 Tex. J. Women & L.  245 (1999).          
ALWD 6th ed.
April Cherry, Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, the Social Construction of Maternal Deviance,
and Some Thoughts about Love and Justice, 8 Tex. J. Women & L.  245 (1999).          
APA 6th ed.
Cherry, A. (1999). Maternal-fetal conflicts, the social construction of maternal
deviance, and some thoughts about love and justice. Texas Journal of Women and the
Law, 8(2), 245-260.
Chicago 7th ed.
April Cherry, "Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, the Social Construction of Maternal
Deviance, and Some Thoughts about Love and Justice," Texas Journal of Women and the
Law 8, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 245-260
McGill Guide 9th ed.
April Cherry, "Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, the Social Construction of Maternal
Deviance, and Some Thoughts about Love and Justice" (1999) 8:2 Tex J Women & L 245.  
MLA 8th ed.
Cherry, April. "Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, the Social Construction of Maternal
Deviance, and Some Thoughts about Love and Justice." Texas Journal of Women and the
Law, vol. 8, no. 2, Spring 1999, p. 245-260. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
April Cherry, 'Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, the Social Construction of Maternal
Deviance, and Some Thoughts about Love and Justice' (1999) 8 Tex J Women & L  245
Provided by: 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device
